Hogan Lovells 2024 Election Impact and Congressional Outlook Report
The UK Government recently announced a series of reforms for strengthening the UK competition regime, including measures that will increase penalties for non-compliance, speed up antitrust investigations and permit better scrutiny of certain mergers – in particular, ‘killer acquisitions’ threatening nascent competition. Aiming to produce a “best in class” competition regime, these reforms signal the most significant changes to UK competition law in 25 years. Most notably, the reforms will result in a stronger (and potentially more interventionist) CMA, albeit a regulatory watchdog more overtly subject to government influence despite its increased powers.
On 20 April 2022, the UK Government announced reforms it will seek to make to the UK competition and consumer law regimes. These measures will be part of a “draft” Digital Markets, Competition and Consumer Bill that was referred to in the recent Queen’s Speech – though as confirmed in a subsequent Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) blog post, this Bill (combining separate digital market proposals) will not be introduced in the current parliamentary session (2022 to 2023).
In terms of the competition regime, the Government has taken on board input received during last year’s consultation process and is now proceeding with important changes to how the CMA enforces the rules. These reforms are set out below.
The Government decided to maintain a voluntary/non-suspensory regime despite the urging of some stakeholders to adopt a mandatory (suspensory) notification system.
The Government is keen that merger control should not place a disproportionate burden on benign or low risk mergers while nevertheless ensuring robust scrutiny of mergers that might raise concerns. On this basis, it remains the Government’s view (as supported by feedback it received during consultation) that the voluntary/non-suspensory nature of the UK’s merger control regime remains appropriate and strikes the right balance.
However, the Government opted to make a number of notable changes to the UK’s merger control regime, including:
The value of a ‘small merger’ exemption based on global thresholds was questionable – it is hard to see how any deals of relevance would likely have escaped the CMA’s jurisdiction on this basis. The move to a UK turnover-based threshold might result in more transactions benefiting from this exemption (in particular, foreign-to-foreign deals generating a UK share of supply of 25% or more but where both merging parties have individual UK turnover below £10m) but even here the impact of this reform might not be particularly significant.
The Government indicated that there will be a UK nexus requirement ensuring caught deals have an appropriate connection with the UK. However, no details are provided as to what form such a test might take. In the absence of an appropriate nexus caveat, this new threshold risks being inappropriately expansive, particularly in terms of its extraterritorial implications (ie catching foreign-to-foreign deals with little if any impact on UK markets). Therefore it will be interesting to see what the Government ultimately proposes.
It is also unclear how this new jurisdictional threshold will interact with the proposed merger powers for the Digital Markets Unit (DMU) confirmed by the Government on 6 May in its published responses to the consultation initiated last summer (see ‘Sending out an SMS’ – UK proposes powers for regulating digital markets). Such powers, which will be included in the draft Digital Markets, Competition and Consumer Bill referred to above, focus primarily on ensuring that acquisitions of promising start ups by large tech companies’ (firms designated as having ‘Strategic Market Status’) cannot fly under the CMA’s jurisdictional radar on account of low target turnover. Until the DMU (which is housed within the CMA) receives statutory underpinning, it will remain in shadow (non-statutory) form.
In recent years the highly flexible 'share of supply' test has come under significant scrutiny. This is based on the expansive way in which the CMA has exerted jurisdiction over deals which appeared vertical in nature or did not otherwise appear to involve a horizontal increment.
However, this flexibility is valued and the Government believes that a lack of clarity and consensus (following consultation) as to how it might be reformed means that it would be “premature to set out proposals for reforming the share of supply test at this time.” At the same time, the Government acknowledged the importance of certainty for merging parties and is concerned that the CMA therefore applies “its existing thresholds more predictably”. Reconciling the valued flexibility with such desired predictability could remain a challenge in the absence of further guidance as to how the CMA plans to apply this test going forward.
The Government declined to replace the existing market study and market investigation system with a new single stage market inquiry tool (as proposed last year). Nor will it make changes allowing the CMA to impose (non-structural) remedies at the end of a market study or impose interim measures to prevent potential harm while market inquiries are ongoing (as proposed last year).
The CMA will, instead, be encouraged to take advantage of the flexibility provided under the current tools and rules (which might include consulting on a market investigation reference directly without first carrying out a market study). To this end, the main focus of the reforms is on procedures that might increase the flexibility, efficiency and effectiveness of remedial action – including:
The Government has expanded the territorial scope of the Competition Act 1998 Chapter I prohibition to include conduct which is likely to have direct, substantial or foreseeable effects within the UK – meaning the UK can pursue international cartels implemented outside the UK that may have had detrimental effects in UK markets.
However, the territorial scope of the Chapter II prohibition will not be amended (conceivably as it would be impractical for the CMA to investigate unilateral behaviour occurring off-shore even if it indirectly had implications for UK commerce). It is also worth noting that the recently published draft guidance on the UK’s Vertical Agreements Block Exemption Order (VABEO) confirms that the VABEO’s safe harbour is only available to vertical agreements implemented in the UK.
The Government also seeks to improve the conduct of competition infringement cases by:
The Government declined to introduce further incentives for cooperation through enhanced leniency arrangements (including full immunity from follow-on damages claims) and will not implement any measures that might offer additional protection to individual whistleblowers during the administrative process. It has also not pursued the proposal to streamline the ‘settlement process’, including through introducing an ‘Early Resolution Agreement’ tool in Chapter II cases.
To help the CMA address a broader range of concerns (and more rapidly), the Government is moving forward with a range of additional enforcement reforms applying across the CMA’s competition tools – including:
It is notable (and a reflection of stakeholder pushback) that the Government declined to:
The Government will provide the CMA more “regular steers” (albeit non-binding) on which sectors of the economy the Government believes the CMA should focus its investigation efforts. It will be interesting to see whether such increased political oversight makes for a less independent, possibly more cautious CMA less willing to exercise initiative or one that feels emboldened to take on strong players proactively where concerns arise.
The Government has also proceeded with other ideas designed to ensure the CMA better monitors the state of competition in key UK markets, including:
Finally, the Government also intends to:
These reforms to the competition regime will have a significant impact on businesses and consumers. Businesses, whether directly consumer-facing or otherwise, should expect greater levels of scrutiny from the CMA and swifter and more direct intervention where the CMA decides to investigate.
These reforms will invariably result in a more powerful CMA but will also see it receive more regular steers from the Government – helping the Government to align competition strategy with wider government policy and objectives. As a result, while the CMA will have enhanced powers, it may also find that, in practical terms, it has less discretion on how it wields those powers.
Authored by Christopher Hutton, Matt Giles, and Joe Beautridge.